Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) & Global Regulatory Efforts
Uses of Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs)
OFCs can be used for legitimate
reasons, taking advantage of: (1) lower explicit taxation and
consequentially increased after tax profit; (2) simpler prudential regulatory
frameworks that reduce implicit taxation; (3) minimum formalities for
incorporation; (4) the existence of adequate legal frameworks that safeguard
the integrity of principal-agent relations; (5) the proximity to major
economies, or to countries attracting capital inflows; (6) the reputation of
specific OFCs, and the specialist services provided; (7) freedom from exchange
controls; and (8) a means for safeguarding assets from the impact of litigation
etc.
Offshore banking
licenses. A multinational
corporation sets up an offshore bank to handle its foreign exchange operations
or to facilitate financing of an international joint venture. An onshore bank
establishes a wholly owned subsidiary in an OFC to provide offshore fund
administration services (e.g., fully integrated global custody, fund
accounting, fund administration, and transfer agent services). The owner of a
regulated onshore bank establishes a sister "parallel" bank in an
OFC. The attractions of the OFC may include no capital tax, no withholding tax
on dividends or interest, no tax on transfers, no corporation tax, no capital
gains tax, no exchange controls, light regulation and supervision, less
stringent reporting requirements, and less stringent trading restrictions.
Offshore
corporations or international business corporations (IBCs). IBCs are limited liability vehicles
registered in an OFC. They may be used to own and operate businesses, issue
shares, bonds, or raise capital in other ways. They can be used to create
complex financial structures. IBCs may be set up with one director only. In
some cases, residents of the OFC host country may act as nominee directors to
conceal the identity of the true company directors. In some OFCs, bearer share
certificates may be used. In other OFCs, registered share certificates are
used, but no public registry of shareholders is maintained. In many OFCs, the
costs of setting up IBCs are minimal and they are generally exempt from all
taxes. IBCs are a popular vehicle for managing investment funds.
Insurance companies. A commercial corporation establishes a
captive insurance company in an OFC to manage risk and minimize taxes. An
onshore insurance company establishes a subsidiary in an OFC to reinsure
certain risks underwritten by the parent and reduce overall reserve and capital
requirements. An onshore reinsurance company incorporates a subsidiary in an
OFC to reinsure catastrophic risks. The attractions of an OFC in these
circumstances include favorable income/withholding/capital tax regime and low
or weakly enforced actuarial reserve requirements and capital standards.
Special purpose
vehicles. One of the most
rapidly growing uses of OFCs is the use of special purpose vehicles (SPV) to
engage in financial activities in a more favorable tax environment. An onshore
corporation establishes an IBC in an offshore center to engage in a specific
activity. The issuance of asset-backed securities is the most frequently cited
activity of SPVs. The onshore corporation may assign a set of assets to the
offshore SPV (e.g., a portfolio of mortgages, loans credit card receivables).
The SPV then offers a variety of securities to investors based on the
underlying assets. The SPV, and hence the onshore parent, benefit from the favorable
tax treatment in the OFC. Financial institutions also make use of SPVs to take
advantage of less restrictive regulations on their activities. Banks, in
particular, use them to raise Tier I capital in the lower tax environments of
OFCs. SPVs are also set up by non-bank financial institutions to take advantage
of more liberal netting rules than faced in home countries, reducing their
capital requirements.
Tax planning. Wealthy individuals make use of favorable
tax environments in, and tax treaties with, OFCs, often involving offshore
companies, trusts, and foundations. There is also a range of schemes that,
while legally defensible, rely on complexity and ambiguity, often involving
types of trusts not available in the client's country of residence. Multinational
companies route activities through low tax OFCs to minimize their total tax
bill through transfer pricing, i.e., goods may be made onshore but invoices are
issues offshore by an IBC owned by the multinational, moving onshore profits to
low tax regimes.
Tax evasion and
money laundering. There are also
individuals and enterprises who rely on banking secrecy to avoid declaring
assets and income to the relevant tax authorities. Those moving money gained
from illegal transaction also seek maximum secrecy from tax and criminal
investigation.
Asset management
and protection. Wealthy
individuals and enterprises in countries with weak economies and fragile
banking systems may want to keep assets overseas to protect them against the
collapse of their domestic currencies and domestic banks, and outside the reach
of existing or potential exchange controls. If these individuals also seek
confidentiality, then an account in an OFC is often the vehicle of choice. In
some cases, fear of wholesale seizures of legitimately acquired assets is also
a motive for going offshore. In this case, confidentiality is very important.
Also, many individuals facing unlimited liability in their home jurisdictions
seek to restructure ownership of their assets through offshore trusts to
protect those assets from onshore lawsuits. Some offshore jurisdictions have
legislation in place that protects those who transfer property to a personal
trust from forced inheritance provisions in the home countries.
Source: Financial Stability Forum's
Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers Report (April 2000).
Significance of Offshore Finance
While incomplete, and with the
limitations discussed below, the available statistics nonetheless indicate that
offshore banking is a very sizeable activity. Staff calculations based on BIS
data suggest that for selected OFCs, on balance sheet OFC cross-border assets
reached a level of US$4.6 trillion at end-June 1999 (about 50 percent of total
cross-border assets), of which US$0.9 trillion in the Caribbean, US$1 trillion
in Asia, and most of the remaining US$2.7 trillion accounted for by the IFCs,
namely London, the U.S. IBFs, and the JOM.
The maintenance of historic and
distortionary regulations on the financial sectors of industrial countries
during the 1960s and 1970s was a major contributing factor to the growth of
offshore banking and the proliferation of OFCs. Specifically, the
emergence of the offshore interbank market during the 1960s and 1970s, mainly
in Europe—hence the eurodollar, can be traced to the imposition of reserve
requirements, interest rate ceilings, restrictions on the range of financial
products that supervised institutions could offer, capital controls, and high
effective taxation in many OECD countries.
In Asia, offshore interbank markets began to develop after 1968 when Singapore launched the Asian Dollar Market (ADM) and introduced the Asian Currency Units (ACUs). The ADM was an alternative to the London eurodollar market, and the ACU regime enabled mainly foreign banks to engage in international transactions under a favorable tax and regulatory environment.
In Europe, Luxembourg began
attracting investors from Germany, France and Belgium in the early 1970s due to
low income tax rates, the lack of withholding taxes for nonresidents on
interest and dividend income, and banking secrecy rules. The Channel Islands
and the Isle of Man provided similar opportunities. In the Middle East, Bahrain
began to serve as a collection center for the region's oil surpluses during the
mid 1970s, after passing banking laws and providing tax incentives to
facilitate the incorporation of offshore banks. In the Western Hemisphere, the
Bahamas and later the Cayman Islands provided similar facilities. Following
this initial success, a number of other small countries tried to attract this
business. Many had little success, because they were unable to offer any
advantage over the more established centers. This did, however, lead some late
arrivals to appeal to the less legitimate side of the business.
By the end of the 1990s, the
attractions of offshore banking seemed to be changing for the financial
institutions of industrial countries as reserve requirements,
interest rate controls and capital controls diminished in importance, while tax
advantages remain powerful. Also, some major industrial countries began to make
similar incentives available on their home territory. For example, the U.S.
established in 1981, in major U.S. cities, the so-called International Banking
Facilities (IBFs). Later, Japan allowed
the creation of the Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) with similar
characteristics. At the same time, supervisory authorities, and to some extent
tax authorities, were adopting the principle of consolidation which reduced the
incentives for banks to carry on business outside their principal jurisdiction. As a result, the
relative advantage of OFCs for conventional banking has become less attractive
to industrial countries, although the tax advantages for asset management
appear to have grown in importance. In fact, reported bank intermediation on
the balance sheet in IFCs has declined over the period 1992-1999, thus
contributing to the overall decline in the share of bank cross-border assets
intermediated through OFCs from 56 percent of total bank cross-border assets in
1992 to about 50 percent of total bank cross-border assets at end-June 1999 (Chart 1).
The Offshore Finance Activity
Banking activity in OFCs is now
predominantly carried out by branches and affiliates of banks incorporated
elsewhere, mainly in major countries, but also in larger emerging market
economies. Since the failure of BCCI and Meridian Bank it has become difficult
for a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction with limited domestic markets to
carry on business in other countries. Supervisors now require banks wishing to
open branches and affiliates to demonstrate a capacity for their home
supervisor to exert consolidated supervision, which it is almost impossible to
do for a bank whose business is almost entirely outside the home country's
jurisdiction.
The physical presence of
establishments of foreign banks in OFCs varies. In some centers they may
originate and, in some cases, fund the business carried on their books. But in
other cases, they may have a very limited physical presence and the business
decisions may all be taken elsewhere. Such establishments
are sometimes known as "shell" branches. There has
been a tendency in the more successful OFCs for the amount of local value added
to grow, as these OFCs have acquired the ability to supply specialist
capabilities and skills. Offshore activities may also take place through
so-called parallel-owned banks, that is, banks that are not
subsidiaries of a bank in the onshore center, but have the same owners or
controllers. Effective consolidated supervision is more difficult
in such cases.
International
Policy Initiatives
Table 3 provides a synoptic description
of the many ongoing initiatives—some of which are more fully discussed below,
aimed at curbing OFC involvement in lax financial regulation, tax evasion, and
financial crime. While cross-border and offshore banking have been at the core
of the Basel Committee's work since the mid-1970s, OFCs have more recently
become a major target of the FATF and OECD because some of them are
increasingly viewed as offering opportunities for money-laundering and tax
evasion, as well as raising obstacles to anti-corruption investigations.
Offshore
Issues: Synopsis of International Policy Initiatives |
|||
Organization |
Sub-Group/Working
Party |
Topic |
Key
Deliverable(s) |
|
|||
Asia-Pacific Group on Money
Laundering |
n/a |
Workshops on the misuse of OFCs. |
Ongoing. |
Basel Committee |
Basel Committee and Offshore Group
of Banking Supervisors |
Supervision of cross-border
banking. |
Survey on implementation of the
1996 Report. |
CFATF |
Sub-group of FATF |
Mutual evaluation process in the
Caribbean. |
Ongoing. |
European Union |
Multi-Disciplinary Group against
organized Crimes |
Cross-border investigation and
cooperation. |
Ongoing. |
FATF(*) |
Ad Hoc Group on non-cooperative
jurisdictions |
Identifying detrimental practices
and non-cooperative jurisdictions. |
List of non-cooperative
jurisdictions published on June 22, 2000. |
Financial Stability |
Working Group on Offshore
Financial Centers |
Potential effects of OFCs on
global financial stability. Compliance with international regulatory
standards, notably cross-border cooperation. |
Report adopted end-March 2000. |
G-7 |
Finance Ministers' Working Group
on financial crimes |
Cross-border cooperation between
law enforcement and regulators. |
Ten key principles. |
|
Financial Experts Group |
Transparency and regulatory
cooperation. |
n/a |
IOSCO |
Working Party 4 Implementation
Committee |
Detect under-regulated and
un-cooperative jurisdictions. |
Follow-up work on the report
prepared in 1997. |
New Zealand |
Pacific Roadshow |
International and regional
dimensions of financial crimes and risks for the South Pacific forum
countries. |
Report on visits to 13 Pacific
countries to warn of financial crimes and misuse of OFCs. |
OECD |
Committee on Fiscal Affairs (*) |
Tax competition. |
1998 Report on harmful tax
competition. |
|
Forum on Harmful Tax Compet. |
Tax havens. |
List of tax havens by June 2000 |
Offshore Group of |
n/a |
Working closely with the Basel
Committee to evaluate OGBS members' compliance with Basel's Core Principles. |
Survey on implementation of the
1996 report. |
Offshore Group of Insurance
Supervisors |
n/a |
Development of various standards. |
Self-assessments. |
Registrar of Offshore Financial
and Banking Services |
Created in 1998 to provide Pacific
regional grouping |
Envisages to focus attention of
regional centers on internal standards. |
n/a |
U.K. Government |
Edwards Report |
Financial regulation in the Crown
Dependencies. |
Follow-up work on the report
prepared in 1998. |
|
KPMG Report |
Financial regulation in the
overseas territories. |
Report expected by July 2000. |
United Nations |
Offshore Forum (ODCCP)(*) |
Develop minimum performance
standards for OFCs |
Standards to be finalized by March
2000. |
Legenda: CFATF = Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force; FATF = Financial Action Task Force; IOSCO =
International Organization of Securities Commissions; ODCCP = U.N. Office for
Drug Control and Crime Prevention. |
Source: IMF
IMF Review of OFCs
The Financial Stability Forum's
Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers was set up to review the uses and
activities of OFCs and their significance for global financial stability. Those
OFCs with weaknesses in financial supervision, cross-border cooperation, and
transparency were felt to allow financial market participants to engage in
regulatory arbitrage, undermining efforts to strengthen the global financial
system. The FSF considers that the key to addressing most of the problems with
these OFCs is through the adoption and implementation of international
standards, particularly in cross-border cooperation. The FSF has identified the
relevant international standards whose implementation would address these
issues, is considering mechanisms for assessing compliance in the
implementation of the standards, and is looking at appropriate incentives to
enhance such compliance. The FSF has also asked the Fund to take on the main
responsibility for conducting these assessments, drawing in expertise from
supervisory agencies and elsewhere.
The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision has been actively promoting more effective cooperation between
"home" and "host" supervisors for many years. Cross-border banking issues
were at the core of the "Basel Concordat" of 1975; the
Concordat was revised in 1983 to take account of the growing need for
consolidated supervision of international banking groups. That work was given
further impetus by the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) in 1991, which led to the publication in 1992 by the Basel
Committee of the Minimum Standards—see Box 2. Subsequently, in 1996, a
Working Group on Cross-Border Banking was established, composed of members of
the Basel Committee and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. This group
prepared a report (the "1996 Report") including 29
recommendations to address a number of practical problems that had arisen in
the implementation of the 1992 Minimum Standards. None of this work is specific
to OFCs, although the problems involved in establishing the relative
responsibilities and effective cooperation between home and host supervisors
arises particularly with supervisors in OFCs. Finally, in 1997, the Basel
Committee issued its Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
providing, inter alia, a comprehensive framework for effective
consolidated supervision which is also appropriate for offshore banking
activities.
Indeed, effective consolidated
supervision is one of the more difficult aspects of supervision to implement in
practice. For this reason, it is generally weakly implemented in many
countries, according to a recent study by the staff,17 which shows that most of the
countries so far assessed were rated non-compliant or materially non-compliant
with regard to Core Principle 20 dealing with consolidated supervision. Indeed,
out of these countries for which consolidated supervision was relevant, only 28
percent were rated fully or largely compliant, with 72 percent found seriously
wanting. One contribution to this weakness is the absence of consolidated
accounting and reporting, together with differences in accounting standards.
Supervisory coordination is shown to be another vital element, somewhat better
implemented but still weak in many instances.
Recommendations for action following
the 1998 Basel Committee's survey to assess implementation of the Core
Principles are currently being considered by the Basel Committee. The
Committee is now considering, against the evidence from implementation, how far
the gaps referred to above and any others should lead to an updating and/or
fine-tuning of the 29 recommendations of the 1996 Report.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established to help protect financial systems from criminal use for the laundering of the proceeds of drug related and other serious crime.18 More recently, the emphasis has been on the extension of the FATF's work to crimes other than those associated with drugs, including some fiscal crimes. The FATF's 40 recommendations have come to be recognized as a statement of best practice in the combat against money-laundering. The Task Force has also encouraged the formation of regional groups, the first of which was the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and which includes the major OFCs in that region. The CFATF has also published a list of 19 recommendations in addition to the FATF's 40, many of which deal with aspects germane to business in OFCs. A similar group has been established in the South Pacific. The FATF's Ad Hoc Group on Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions was established in 1998 to develop a common process for FATF members to evaluate whether jurisdictions are cooperating with FATF anti-money laundering initiatives. This work was finalized on June 22, 2000, when the FATF published a report which included a list of 15 non-cooperative jurisdictions.
The U.N. Offshore Forum is a 1999
initiative of the U.N.'s Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention to deny
criminals access to OFCs for the purpose of laundering the proceeds of criminal
activities. The Forum's program seeks political commitment from OFCs towards
the adoption of minimum performance standards. In return, the Forum
will provide technical assistance that will aid OFCs in coming into compliance
with the standards. The Forum's program was set out to the global financial
community in March 2000 during its Plenary Meeting in the Cayman Islands.
The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs
(CFA) has established the Forum on Harmful Tax Competition under the aegis of
the G-7, which, since the Birmingham Summit of May 1998, placed a greater
emphasis on the need to step up international cooperation to enhance the
effectiveness of attempts to prevent the erosion of the ability of major
countries' tax authorities to tax the income and capital of their residents.
The OECD's Forum was created as the result of the OECD May 1998 report on
Harmful Tax Competition and it was assigned responsibility, inter alia, for
undertaking an ongoing evaluation of existing and proposed preferential tax
regimes in OECD member and non-member countries, and examining whether
particular jurisdictions constitute tax havens. The OECD has informed
some 49 jurisdictions that they are considered to be "tax havens."
They will be classified in three categories according to their willingness to
cooperate with OECD countries' tax authorities: a group of
"non-cooperative" OFCs against whom sanctions may be taken; a second
group which are committed to "reform," but where such reforms have
not been set in train; and a third group which are in the process of
implementing reforms. The names of those falling in the first two categories
are expected to be published.
There have also been assessments and
surveys other than those carried out by recognized international bodies. For
example, the U.K. authorities have published a review of the offshore business
of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, which provides considerable
information on the nature of the business carried out in those jurisdictions. The U.K. authorities
are also sponsoring a study by KPMG of the main overseas dependent territories
which provide facilities for offshore business. The work is expected to be
completed by mid-2000 and the results will published.
All these international initiatives aimed at OFCs relate in various ways to the Fund's heightened focus on assessments of financial stability, including under multilateral and bilateral surveillance, and more recently notably through the implementation of the joint Bank-Fund Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). These issues are, inter alia, discussed in a companion Policy paper. issued by IMF
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